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Ten years after the Responsibility to Protect 
(RtoP) was unanimously adopted by the 
General Assembly in 2005, the international 
community is still faced with challenges 
of ensuring that genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing 
are never again committed. In light of RtoP’s 
10th anniversary and ongoing situations 
of mass atrocities around the world, the 
Columbia University Global Policy Initiative 
(CGPI) and the International Relations 
Research  Center at the University of São 
Paulo (NUPRI) organized a two-day conference 
on The Future of the Responsibility to 
Protect: Responsibility while Protecting and 
Implementation Mechanisms. 
Ambassador Antonio de Aguiar Patriota, 
Permanent Representative of Brazil to the UN, 
and Dr. Jennifer Welsh, Special Adviser to the 
UN Secretary-General on the Responsibility 
to Protect, presented keynote speeches. 
Topics under consideration included the 
Brazilian concept of Responsibility while 
Protecting, implementation mechanisms for 
RtoP from diplomacy to the use of force, and 
the future of RtoP. Participants gathered 
at Columbia University in the City of New 
York and participated remotely from the 
University of São Paulo and the Columbia 
Global Center-Rio de Janeiro.
RtoP has been described as a fundamental 
doctrinal innovation within the UN system. 
It shifted the definition of state sovereignty 
to imply responsibility for preventing atrocity 
crimes domestically, a major rethinking of 
absolutist conceptions of sovereignty. While 
still far from perfect or easily achieved, 
RtoP strengthened the moral imperative of 
international response to atrocities through 
diplomacy, sanctions, peacekeeping, or—
in the most extreme case—coercive use of 
force. 
The concept of RtoP was first coined by 
Francis Deng and then developed in 2001 by 
the Canadian Independent Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), 
chaired by Gareth Evans and Mohamed 
Sahnoun. It was then adopted by the General 
Assembly in paragraphs 138-140 of the 
2005 World Summit Outcome Document 
(see appendix). 
The World Summit Outcome Document 
asserts that states have a responsibility to 
protect their civilians in cases of genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and 
ethnic cleansing. Should a state manifestly 
fail to protect its civilians, the international 
community has a responsibility to act in an 
effective and timely manner through the 
Security Council. RtoP is interpreted to have 
three pillars: (1) the primary responsibility 
of the state to protect; (2) a corresponding 
responsibility of the international community 
to assist the state in protecting its population; 
and (3) finally, should the state fail to protect, 
a residual responsibility of the international 
community to take timely action through the 
Security Council.1
Introduction
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This gives a license to the UN Security Council 
to go beyond the most narrow readings of 
its responsibilities in Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, namely to protect international 
peace and security, and prevent threats or 
breeches to the peace or acts of aggression. 
RtoP says that there are some domestic 
crimes that are so severe that they should 
be interpreted by the Security Council as a 
fundamental part of its mandate.
At the same time, RtoP is a leash on the 
Security Council. It asserts that while the 
Council has broad discretion to interpret what 
constitutes a threat to the peace Chapter VII 
it is not an infinitely broad category. In the 
view of the General Assembly, it is limited to 
protecting populations within countries from 
the four atrocity crimes.
In 2011, this doctrine of RtoP was put to 
the test in its most extreme form. Utilizing 
an RtoP framework, the Security Council 
referred the situation in Libya to the 
International Criminal Court and applied 
sanctions with Resolution 1970, and later 
authorized NATO to implement a no-fly zone 
over Libya and use all means necessary to 
protect civilians from the imminent threat of 
atrocities in Resolution 1973 (see appendix). 
This intervention was seen by some to have 
far exceeded its mandate with the ultimate 
ouster and death of Colonel Muammar el-
Qaddafi and resulting instability and chaos 
reigning in Libya today. 
In reaction, the Brazilian government 
presented the concept of Responsibility 
while Protecting (RwP) in a 2011 concept 
note presented to the UN Security Council 
(see appendix). This concept held that 
forcible intervention should be done only as 
an absolute last resort after diplomacy and 
prevention have failed, it must be limited and 
proportionate in nature, and it must result 
in effective protection and avoid further 
violence or instability.
RwP was, in effect, a reconceptualization of 
the RtoP norm and a call for further debate 
and deliberation about not just what RtoP 
was but how to implement it effectively in 
order to actually save lives. 
Four years after the intervention in Libya, 
the concepts of RtoP and RwP are still 
evolving. This conference asked what 
happened to RtoP after Libya, how RwP has 
changed RtoP, how we can improve effective 
implementation of RtoP, and finally what 
the future of RtoP and atrocity prevention 
holds. The conference’s three panels will 
be discussed below as well as  the two 
keynote addresses. Recommendations are 
presented to improve our understanding 
and implementation of atrocity prevention 
and response.
1  RtoP is distinct but similar to the concept 
of “protection of civilians.” While RtoP focuses on 
preventing or stopping the four atrocity crimes, 
protection of civilians obliges parties in an ongoing 
armed conflict to uphold all of their obligations 
under international human rights and humanitarian 
law.
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Keynote Address: Ambassador 
Antonio de Aguiar Patriota, Permanent 
Representative of Brazil to the UN 
Ambassador Antonio de Aguiar Patriota 
delivered a keynote address on April 9, 2015 
on the Future of the Responsibility to Protect. 
He spoke of the great challenges facing the 
United Nations today, as well as causes for 
optimism, in light of the organization’s 70th 
anniversary. 
The ambassador began his remarks by 
noting the vast geopolitical transformations 
that have occurred since the UN’s founding 
in 1945. Drawing a parallel to the transition 
from a unipolar to a multipolar world at the 
Vienna Congress in 1815, the ambassador 
sees the UN’s anniversary as an opportunity 
to reflect on the contemporary transition to a 
multipolar world and the rise of new regional 
powers. 
The ambassador went on to explain the larger 
role of Brazil in global affairs today. Not only 
does Brazil have more influence today than 
at any previous stage in its history, including 
through an expanding network of Embassies, 
but the ambassador also asserted that 
Brazil’s rise and its commitment to non-
proliferation and peaceful international 
relations allows it to play a vital role in 
the world. Instead of consolidating a 
hegemonic sphere of influence, Brazil is 
instead committed to creating a sphere 
of cooperation for peaceful relations. He 
asserted that not only does Brazil have 
the capacity to create such a sphere of 
cooperation but also a responsibility to play 
this vital role in global politics. 
In the context of the UN’s 70th anniversary, 
Ambassador Patriota outlined some of the 
most important accomplishments as well 
as key issues faced by the organization. 
He was optimistic about the UN’s capacity 
to respond to new challenges in both 
the normative and institutional sense, in 
particular with respect to complex thematic 
areas. He highlighted the modernizing 
platform of the Post-2015 Sustainable 
Development Agenda and the outcome 
of the Rio+20 Conference on Sustainable 
Development. These collective processes 
have created a road-map for universally 
applicable Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs), displaying the strong normative role 
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the UN can fulfill. He further highlighted 
that the previous Millennium Development 
Goals, while generally a positive move 
forward, were a top-down process  and did 
not include awareness of  the challenges 
posed by climate change. If adopted, the 
SDGs would serve as a key point of progress 
for international cooperation.  
Ambassador Patriota stressed the 
importance of the review of peacekeeping 
operations and of the peacebuilding 
architecture underway this year as 
important developments.
Ambassador Patriota then turned to the 
issue of Responsibility to Protect (RtoP). 
This year marks the 21st anniversary of the 
Rwandan Genocide and the 20th anniversary 
of the Srebrenica massacre, which he 
emphasized as an appropriate opportunity 
to reflect on the groundbreaking 2005 World 
Summit Outcome Document and RtoP. The 
ambassador noted that RtoP attempts to 
mobilize or appeal to a universal conscience 
in cases of genocide or mass atrocities. He 
also commented that he recently met with 
Hubert Védrine, France’s special envoy 
to pursue limiting the veto of permanent 
members of the UN Security Council and to 
develop a special code of conduct for the 
Security Council. He noted that this was 
an initiative in the same vein as RtoP and 
should go hand in hand with broader reforms 
to make the Security Council more reflective 
of the current multipolar global system. In 
Ambassador Patriota’s view, it was very 
refreshing to see attempts to conceive new 
multilateral approaches to these key issues 
of international peace and security within 
a more multipolar configuration of world 
powers. 
Finally, Ambassador Patriota turned his 
attention to some of the major challenges 
facing the United Nations on its 70th 
anniversary. Notwithstanding some of the 
normative advances in the agenda of the UN 
Security Council, including the attention now 
paid to protection of civilians and women 
and children in armed conflict, Ambassador 
Patriota expressed concern that the current 
practices and the composition of the UN 
Security Council fail to provide adequate 
answers to contemporary challenges. He 
focused attention on three specific recent 
cases where the Security Council has 
failed to unify for action: Syria, Ukraine, 
and Gaza. According to the ambassador, 
these cases all highlight the need to rethink 
how we approach new challenges such as 
the role of non-state actors and terrorism 
in international peace and security. These 
crises show the failures of diplomacy and 
the limits of military action. Ambassador 
Patriota pointed out that these issues should 
be unifying for the world, but the sad reality 
is that strategies that have been adopted by 
the Security Council have been divisive.
To deal with these challenges, Ambassador 
Patriota argued that RtoP and protection 
of civilians had an important place in the 
debate. He noted that the 2011 Brazilian 
concept note concerning the Responsibility 
while Protecting (RwP) is still highly relevant 
to today’s discussions of RtoP. RwP was 
developed in response to Brazil’s concerns 
regarding the Security Council authorized 
NATO intervention in Libya in 2011. Brazil 
received wide praise as an emerging norm 
entrepreneur for their role in trying to 
reestablish minimum threshold criteria for 
coercive intervention. 
Ambassador Patriota called for an honest 
and objective assessment of the potential 
for protecting civilians through prevention 
and an evidence-based evaluation of 
the success of military force or robust 
peacekeeping in protecting civilians and 
decreasing potential loss of life. 
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According to the ambassador, the 
intervention in Libya showed that there 
is a need to carefully assess the likely 
consequences of an intervention before 
approving Chapter VII forcible intervention 
mandates. Furthermore, if it were decided 
that military force would have a responsible 
and effective impact on a situation, 
monitoring and accountability mechanisms 
in line with an RwP framework would have 
to be authorized and implemented. What 
is needed for the future is responsible and 
effective protection that can be monitored 
and that truly has an impact for those in dire 
need of protection. 
Antonio Jorge Ramalho, Kai Michael Kenkel, Ambassador Antonio Patriota, Gustavo Macedo, & João Marcos Leme.
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The first panel focused on the concept 
of Responsibility while Protecting (RwP), 
developed by Brazil in 2011 in response to 
the Security Council authorized intervention 
in Libya. All panelists maintained that RwP 
advanced and improved the Responsibility 
to Protect (RtoP) framework. Some of the 
issues covered included the formulation of 
this doctrine by the Brazilian academics and 
diplomats, the shortcomings of the RtoP 
in practice, the issue of sequencing of the 
RtoP pillars, prevention mechanisms, as 
well as exhausting diplomatic means before 
authorizing use of force at the UN Security 
Council. 
Questions considered by the panel: What is 
the Brazilian concept of Responsibility while 
Protecting (RwP)? How does RwP change 
RtoP? What direct policy implications does 
RwP have and what should states do to 
further RwP’s normative development?
Panelists
• Chair: Ambassador Antonio de Aguiar 
Patriota, Permanent Representative of 
Brazil to the United Nations
• Gustavo Carlos Macedo, University of 
São Paulo
• João Marcos Leme, Brazilian Embassy 
London
• Antonio Jorge Ramalho, University of 
Brasilia
• Kai Michael Kenkel, Instituto de 
Relações Internacionais at PUC-Rio
All panelists asserted that the 2011 military 
intervention in Libya wounded RtoP due to 
its failure to understand the circumstances 
in the country, failure to prevent the collapse 
of the State (as is apparent today), and 
the international community’s failure to 
rebuild strong governance and institutions 
in Libya after the intervention. All panelists 
applauded Brazil for the concept of RwP, 
which emerged as a result of perceived 
failures of Libya, and all emphasized Brazil’s 
role and vision as an emerging global leader 
and norm entrepreneur. 
RwP is an attempt to protect RtoP from 
some bad genes in its own DNA, one 
panelist noted.
Though RtoP is a noble concept, some of 
its nuances and protections were lost in 
translation from the 2001 report of the 
Independent Commission on Intervention 
and State Sovereignty (ICISS) to the 2005 
World Summit Outcome Document. By 
bringing nuance and criteria back into the 
debate, the RwP concept has actually helped 
RtoP recover its credibility after Security 
Council Resolution 1973, a panelist noted. 
The most important elements of RwP were 




described as the precedence of prevention 
and diplomacy over the use of force; the 
use of force only as a last resort; and 
emphasis on accountability, monitoring, 
and proportionality if force is used. 
The panelists went on to say that RwP 
highlights that extreme measures under Pillar 
Three of RtoP are in most cases inadequate. 
Most often the use of force adds to more 
violence or may replace a violent status 
quo with a new kind of lawlessness and 
destabilization. RtoP itself was described 
as an asset of dual-use, comparable to 
sovereignty or nuclear energy. These dual-
use assets are not good or bad in and of 
themselves but are subject to use selectively 
and may be misused in order to advance 
other agendas. The panelist asserted that 
we should not demonize RtoP for this but 
discipline it. This is what RwP attempts to 
add to RtoP: a disciplining of when and how 
to use coercive intervention. 
RwP can bridge gaps among a wide variety 
of countries and views on RtoP because of 
its ability to recover part of RtoP’s original 
ethos in the ICISS report, a panelist 
asserted. 
One panelist also highlighted the strong 
commitment of Brazil to Pillars One and 
Two of RtoP and commented that Brazil had 
challenged the pro-intervention monopoly 
of coercive measures and overwhelming 
focus on Pillar Three coercive intervention. 
They asserted that the 2011 concept note 
on RwP was still highly relevant today. 
They also highlighted that instead of 
only focusing on military intervention, 
RwP pushes for a new humanism that 
would involve a renewed commitment to 
international law, an improved governance 
mechanism at the UN Security Council, and 
require active participation from civil society 
and academia to keep us on a humanistic 
road-map.
Another panelist noted that RwP should be 
thought of as a “concern” to be considered 
under the RtoP framework, rather than its 
own norm or doctrine justifying a separate 
normative structure. RwP should be seen 
as a collective and global concern about the 
implementation of RtoP frameworks that 
helps revise and hone the RtoP agenda. The 
panelist asserted that RwP is not and will 
not be its own norm – rather it is a concept 
that will become a principle to inform the 
normative evolution of the Responsibility to 
Protect. 
Several panelists noted that RwP still 
lacks clarity and needs strong political 
leadership  from Brazil to move the debate 
forward on accountability and monitoring of 
interventions. Others held that the concept 
needs to find other member state champions 
to push it forward and encouraged the UN 
Group of Friends on RtoP to formally discuss 
the role of RwP in RtoP. 
All panelists agreed that for lasting peace, 
prevention and deterrence mechanisms 
should be enhanced, hasty use of force 
should be constrained, and a higher 
moral threshold should be applied when 
authorizing the use of force. 
The importance of preventing mass atrocities 
in the first place and also protecting civilians 
before and after any kind of intervention 
was emphasized. It was acknowledged that 
much of this prevention agenda would take 
place outside of the Security Council, and 
the panelists encouraged the connection 
of the post-2015 agenda with issues of 
structural atrocity prevention and long-term 
peacebuilding. 
Panelists pointed out that all actions of 
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military intervention could instigate further 
violence and have grave consequences for 
civilians, be it authorized by the leaders 
and authorities of an illiberal state or the 
UN Security Council. Therefore less or non-
militaristic and cooperative interventions, 
such as structural prevention methods like 
the eradication of poverty and overcoming 
global injustice, were cited as possibly 
more effective measures to prevent acts of 
atrocities. In this context, RwP addresses 
disciplining the use of force and focusing 
on the accountability and proportionality of 
any intervention as well as employment of 
greater diplomatic efforts to handle conflicts. 
Another panelist maintained that RwP is a 
catalyst for building lasting relationships with 
states and local governments. Stressing that 
both the lives of civilians and the sovereignty 
of states are at stake, this panelist asserted 
that states that are part of the problem should 
thus be part of the solution too. Parties need 
to acknowledge that military interventions 
often take place without deliberations of 
proportionality and impartiality, and they fail 
to consider inclusion of local authorities that 
might bring about lasting peace. 
Further militarization and internationalization 
of local conflicts have destabilizing impacts 
for problematic states and regions, and in the 
longer run they cause more harm, a panelist 
said. Emphasis should be placed on engaging 
with local authorities from the very beginning 
because those authorities will ultimately 
maintain the legitimacy and sovereignty 
of the state and hold responsibility for 
protecting civilians. Creating international 
and local dialogue, influencing structural 
socio-economic developments, and 
establishing good governance institutions 
are of crucial importance. 
The panelists concluded by recognizing the 
major doctrinal development RtoP provided 
to the multilateral system for peace and 
security. Citing a Global Public Policy 
Institute report, panelists noted that what is 
needed now is “responsible and effective” 
protection and objective analysis of the 
efficacy of the use of force.1 
After ten years of implementation what is 
now needed to improve atrocity prevention 
is an objective evaluation of how RtoP has 
contributed to the protection of civilians over 
the last decade and how we can safeguard 
this concept in order to ensure it protects 
civilians in the future, learn from mistakes, 
and draw inspiration from new ideas. 
1  “Effective and Responsible Protection from 
Atrocity Crimes: Toward Global Action,” Berlin: Global 
Public Policy Institute,  April 2015.
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In the second panel, the discussion revolved 
around implementation of the concept of 
the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP). This 
included a discussion on sequencing of 
RtoP’s three pillars, use of sanctions, use of 
coercive force, and protection of civilians. 
Questions considered by the panel: How 
should RtoP be implemented from prevention 
to reaction? What are best practices for 
civilian protection and peacekeeping? How 
was RtoP used as a mediation tool in Kenya? 
What is the role of sanctions as a tool for 
atrocity prevention? Can force protect and, if 
so, when can it legitimately be used?
Panelists
• Chair: Simon Adams, Global Centre for 
the Responsibility to Protect
• Emily Paddon, Columbia University 
• Elisabeth Lindenmayer, Columbia 
University 
• Robert Pape, University of Chicago 
• Helen Mulvein, Legal Counsellor for 
the Permanent Mission of the United 
Kingdom to the United Nations 
In discussing the implementation of the 
Responsibility to Protect, it was emphasized 
that RtoP does not just apply when crises are 
underway. At its heart RtoP is a prevention 
doctrine that applies everywhere at all 
times. To be most effective, it must utilize 
all the tools of early warning and early 
action. In a similar vein, a panelist noted 
that in most cases intervention takes place 
with the consent of countries or at their 
explicit request (in the form of peacekeeping 
missions). It was acknowledged that 
situations in which RtoP coercive military 
intervention could be invoked would be rare 
and extraordinary circumstances. 
Although certain countries are more at risk 
of mass atrocities taking place than others, 
it was stressed that no countries can be 
categorized as “zero risk” countries. To 
ensure effective prevention, all countries 
must continually monitor for early warning 
signs, should have atrocity prevention 
policies in place, and should have national 
legislation criminalizing mass atrocities and 
ensuring accountability mechanisms. 
The idea of sequencing the three pillars of 
RtoP, as proposed in the initial conception 
of Responsibility while Protecting (RwP), 
was questioned as an unrealistic 
understanding of crisis situations and an 
untenable requirement. Panelists posited 
that sequencing was unlikely to reflect the 
reality on the ground and that pragmatism 
had to be taken into account in any attempt 
to coherently operationalize the concept of 
RtoP.
Second Panel: Operationalizing the 
Responsibility to Protect
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When discussing the application of RtoP, two 
things need to be kept in mind, according to 
one panelist. First, the world has witnessed 
a profound change in conflicts over the past 
decades; new conflicts are often asymmetric, 
and the rise of non-state armed groups as 
well as criminal networks in fragile states 
challenges the conventional toolbox of the 
UN and other actors. Second, concerning 
the political context, RtoP can never be 
discussed in a vacuum. 
As a norm of the UN, its application depends 
on the geopolitical context. Any tool deployed 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter requires 
the political will of the permanent five 
members (China, France, Russia, UK, US) 
and at least four other members of the 
Security Council. Panelists acknowledged 
that the Security Council had come a long 
way in terms of referencing both RtoP and 
the protection of civilians in thematic and 
country specific resolutions.
The 2007-2008 African Union mediation in 
Kenya was discussed as a key example of 
RtoP’s success at early prevention. Contrary 
to many assertions that RtoP is solely a 
Western imposition, the 2008 mediation was 
an entirely African initiative led by former UN 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan at the request 
of the African Union. It was both a prevention 
and reactive effort, one panelist noted, as it 
stopped the escalation of violence but also 
responded to the more than 1,000 dead 
and 500,000 refugees already resulting 
from the crisis. While RtoP was not explicitly 
cited at the time of the mediation, in later 
accounts Annan noted that the context of 
RtoP and threat of RtoP intervention was 
a key element bringing the parties to the 
negotiating table. 
The 2013 Kenyan election was also 
highlighted as an overlooked success of RtoP. 
A panelist said that it was the result of the 
2008 mediation efforts and continual efforts 
in the run up to 2013 that helped prevent 
another wave of violence and displacement 
in the country. It was acknowledged that 
successes in prevention need to be more 
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openly discussed and analyzed so the 
clear benefits of early diplomatic efforts 
could be seen. 
Sanctions were also discussed as a vital tool 
available to the Security Council, member 
states, and regional groups to address 
atrocity situations. Using Article 41 of the 
UN Charter, the Security Council can impose 
targeted and meaningful sanctions on a 
case-by-case basis in coordination with 
relevant regional actors. Sanctions apply 
pressure on regimes, individuals, or entities 
to change their behavior through asset 
freezes, financial restrictions, travel bans, 
and restricting diplomatic contact.
Acknowledging past concerns regarding 
blanket sanctions, a panelist noted that 
criteria for sanctions designation are 
becoming more and more specific and are 
only aimed at those responsible for crimes 
while minimizing the impact on the civilian 
population. It was highlighted that sanctions 
in and of themselves would never be a 
silver bullet to stop atrocities but must be 
considered a tool within a broader strategy.  
The case of Libya was discussed as an 
example of the most aggressive application 
of RtoP – the coercive use of military force 
against a sovereign state. NATO involvement 
in Libya in 2011 is often portrayed as a failure 
because the intervention went beyond the 
spirit of the mandate articulated in Security 
Council Resolution 1973. 
However, in a push-back against this 
narrative, one panelist argued that Libya 
was already a failed state prior to the 
intervention and the Qaddafi regime’s 
ouster was inevitable with or without NATO 
intervention. While acknowledging that RwP 
was a tremendous step forward to reform 
our thinking of how to understand RtoP 
intervention, the panelist warned that RwP 
increases the role of politics in the military 
phase of an intervention. The panelist 
asserted that this is unworkable and is likely 
to lead to more chaotic interventions and 
more loss of life. 
The panelist asserted that RwP would not 
have prevented regime change in Libya in 
2011. According to the research presented 
by the panelist, the Qaddafi regime 
was already broken before the NATO 
intervention. More than a dozen ministers 
had already defected from the state. There 
were only 8,000 soldiers fighting for the 
regime by early March. 60,000 soldiers 
were unaccounted for and some 8,000 had 
defected to the rebels. Additionally, more 
than 75 percent of the Libyan population 
centers had broken away from the state by 
early March 2011. 
In Misrata, a key battleground city in 
central Libya, there was a significant 
rise in the number of rebel forces from 
4,000 in May to 36,000 in October 2011, 
according the panelist’s research. It 
was this prominent rebel force—not the 
minimal aerial bombing from NATO—that 
caused the city to fall to the rebels. Thus 
the panelist asserted regime change in 
Libya was brought about from within rather 
than established through the international 
intervention. 
Panelists noted that the current failure of the 
Libyan state is a failure to take the necessary 
measures for successful peacebuilding. As 
one panelist said, for two years after the 
fall of Qaddafi there was relative peace in 
Libya. This was an opportunity that was not 
seized upon to prevent the current fractured 
governments and crises that have severely 
destabilized the country. 
Lastly, in a discussion on protection of 
civilians and peacekeeping, one panelist 
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noted a checkered record for protection of 
civilians, and highlighted several challenges 
for implementation on the ground. Successful 
peacekeeping missions are dependent on 
strong, unambiguous political backing from 
the Security Council. However, “protection” 
itself has no common understanding and 
interpretations vary considerably within 
missions, across missions, and between 
member states, the panelist said. 
It is often unclear what the strategic 
direction of a protection mandate is and how 
it fits into other mission objectives, leading 
to incoherent practices on the ground. The 
panelist highlighted a growing gap between 
the justified expectations of civilians on 
the ground for protection and the actions 
peacekeeping missions take to protect. 
There is a need to move beyond simply talking 
about greater resource allocation as the key 
to a successful peacekeeping mission, the 
panelist asserted. Resource availability, 
doctrine, and training are all critical factors 
that deserve our attention. However, the 
bigger issue that requires urgent attention 
is the erosion of the underlying political 
bargain of peacekeeping: what it can be, 
what it should be, and what it should not be 
used towards; who is willing to shoulder the 
burden, when, where and for how long. 
What is required is a frank discussion 
about the feasibility and the possibilities 
for consistent protection given the political 
realities. The very real divisions on the 
Security Council between those that pen and 
finance mandates and those who actually 
implement them on the ground need to be 
addressed. 
An open discussion on the real 
circumstances, opportunities, and 
limitations for peacekeepers to carry out 
protection mandates is needed. Ambiguous 
language and politicization of mandates are 
issues that need to be tackled through such 
conversations. 
Finally, a panelist noted that we cannot 
think of RtoP’s normative life as a linear 
progression. It is instead being continually 
debated, reassessed, and reinterpreted 
by each crisis it faces. And hopefully, 
through this process of examination, it is 
strengthened.
RtoP is only ten years old. What was the 
state of human rights in 1958, ten short 
years after the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights was adopted? In 1958, states 
instrumentalized human rights for their own 
objectives or ignored them entirely, but that 
did not mean we threw away the human 
rights framework. 
Today when we see a protection crisis we 
do not walk away. We learn from failures; 
we adapt; and we hopefully move forward. 
We still need to guard against the misuse 
of RtoP and continually be working towards 
consistent application, but overall, we are 




Keynote Address: Dr. Jennifer Welsh, 
Special Adviser to the UN Secretary-
General on the Responsibility to Protect
Dr. Jennifer Welsh delivered a keynote 
address on April 10, 2015 on the Future of the 
Responsibility to Protect. Despite the many 
facets of the debate on the Responsibility 
to Protect (RtoP), the principle rests on 
a simple assertion: there is a collective 
responsibility to protect populations from 
acts that the international community as a 
whole has stigmatized as crimes – crimes 
against humanity, genocide, war crimes and 
ethnic cleansing. That responsibility rests 
first and foremost with the state in which 
populations live. But, and this was the core of 
the principle at its inception, outside actors 
have a responsibility to assist states in a 
variety of ways to fulfill that protection role, 
Dr. Welsh asserted. If a state is manifestly 
failing to protect, either from a breakdown 
in capacity or from an express intention to 
inflict atrocity crimes, outside actors have a 
residual protection role. 
Dr. Welsh acknowledged that the principle 
can be abused and manipulated. She would 
not, however, posit that RtoP is a dual-use 
asset like a drone, which is neither good nor 
bad. The core of RtoP is good. The question is 
how it can be used for productive purposes—
protection—and how we can address and 
limit those instances in which we may see it 
being abused.  
Almost a decade has passed since member 
states endorsed the principle of RtoP in the 
2005 World Summit Outcome Document. 
We now enjoy a high degree of consensus 
on the overall parameters of the concept 
and the three-pillar framework outlined in 
2009. The Secretary-General has tried to 
make very clear in his annual reports that 
each of the pillars is equally important and 
the edifice cannot stand without all of them, 
Dr. Welsh said. 
There has also been a concerted effort, 
particularly since 2009, to shift from 
concept to implementation. Examples of 
this shift include the creation of the Joint 
Office of the Special Advisers on Genocide 
Prevention and RtoP based in New York; the 
development of a convening mechanism for 
Under-Secretaries-General of the UN; and 
the creation of new regional mechanisms, 
including the Latin American Network for 
Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention and 
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the African Union Rapid-Reaction Force. 
Several states have also built up their own 
domestic capacity to address these four 
crimes and violations specified by RtoP, 
whether they be internally focused—in terms 
of developing a capacity to assess national 
risk—or externally focused, such as the US 
Atrocity Prevention Board. While some are 
still debating the theory of RtoP, most have 
turned their attention to practice and how 
RtoP can concretely make a difference. 
The principle of RtoP has also been invoked 
in thematic and country specific resolutions 
of the Security Council and Human Rights 
Council. In short, RtoP has become a 
part of the world’s diplomatic language. 
Consensus has steadily grown, and it 
has grown toward the goal of building 
partnerships between national, regional, 
and international organizations to prevent 
and respond to atrocity crimes. The debate 
in the UN Security Council in 2014 to mark the 
20th anniversary of the Rwandan Genocide 
spoke powerfully to some of the progress 
that has been made in the battle against 
atrocity crimes. It is no longer possible for 
such acts to occur inside a country and 
for some to argue that it is not a matter of 
international concern. 
And yet, Dr. Welsh asked, do we always see 
the kind of response we would like to see? 
We continue to see situations where warning 
signs were clearly present and we failed to 
heed them. South Sudan is an example of 
this; so too is the Central African Republic, 
where the international community did 
respond but only after serious crimes had 
been committed. 
We also see situations where the 
humanitarian imperative is overwhelming 
but where strategic considerations 
outweigh the imperative to act to protect 
populations. Moreover, in trying to make 
RtoP   acceptable to a broad constituency, 
there has at times been an overemphasis 
on prevention and a lack of emphasis on 
response. Both aspects of the principle 
are critical. There have been false divisions 
created among the three pillars, which 
has allowed some states to argue that 
they support some aspects of RtoP, but 
not others. We are now able to move to a 
point where the three-pillar edifice can be 
reaffirmed, Dr. Welsh asserted.
We also should be careful about trying to 
‘tame’ RtoP too much in our efforts to gain 
political consensus. As the previous Special 
Adviser, Edward C. Luck, reminds us, norms 
should be aspirational, should challenge, 
and should encourage us all to do better. 
We need to remember that RtoP was 
created because the status quo was not 
acceptable. We had all of the international 
law we needed—the Genocide Convention, 
the Geneva Conventions, international 
human rights, and international 
humanitarian law—but what we did not 
have was full implementation of that law. 
There was a clear gap between states’ legal 
commitments and what populations were 
experiencing every day.
While the past decade has seen concrete 
progress on RtoP, there are five challenges 
that continue to confront those who work to 
implement the norm.
First, despite being a multifaceted agenda, 
the implementation of RtoP is still too often 
associated with the coercive use of military 
force and seen to be a principle that belongs 
solely to the UN Security Council. The Security 
Council is one key ‘owner’ of RtoP, but not 
the only one. We must also acknowledge 
that there is an inbuilt inconsistency in the 
Security Council’s approach to RtoP, given 
the way states articulated the principle in 
2005. Member states asked the Security 
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Council to address situations involving 
atrocity crimes on a ‘case-by-case’ basis. 
That does not mean that one cannot strive 
for greater consistency in how the Council 
approaches such situations; indeed one 
should, Dr. Welsh said. But selectivity is 
likely to remain, in the near term, part of 
the Council’s approach. How that selectivity 
is perceived by others will affect RtoP’s 
legitimacy. However, even when the Security 
Council is inconsistent, it is absolutely 
imperative that other actors who do not 
face the same political constraints are 
absolutely consistent in characterizing 
situations accurately—no matter how 
difficult those situations may be—in order 
to draw attention to those crises and to 
remind states of their responsibilities. 
Secondly, there remains some suspicion 
among organizations involved in 
humanitarian work about the political and 
coercive aspects of RtoP. This is a real 
challenge. We all may be directed toward 
protection but there is an understandable 
concern about the potential politicization of 
humanitarian efforts, Dr. Welsh said.
Thirdly, there is continued difficulty in 
mobilizing the UN and other organizations 
for prevention and early action versus crisis 
response. Dr. Welsh asserted her firm 
belief that in the next decade of RtoP, 
the key to realizing prevention is to make 
atrocity crime prevention and response a 
‘normal’ rather than exceptional way that 
organizations and actors function. Much 
can be gained by utilizing existing information 
gathering and analysis techniques, and 
embellishing them with a framework that 
specifically focuses on the risk factors for 
atrocity crimes and establishes a process 
for identifying and elevating situations of 
concern to decision makers. Dr. Welsh noted 
that her office is trying to do this through 
the UN Human Rights Up Front program, 
by helping to define criteria that the UN will 
use for identifying situations at risk and 
mobilizing early action. 
In order to make sustained progress, we 
also need to continue to raise the place of 
atrocity crime prevention and response in 
the hierarchy of national priorities. Atrocity 
prevention should not just play a role in what 
national governments do in multinational 
forums, but also in what they do at home. 
Legislative bodies play a key role here, and 
we are only beginning to consider how they 
can play a part in the implementation of 
RtoP, Dr. Welsh said. 
Fourth, some of the crises we face today 
are very different from those that were in 
the minds of the norm entrepreneurs at the 
end of the 1990s when the idea of RtoP 
was developed. Syria has proved to be an 
intractable conflict where the erosion of 
humanitarian principles on all sides and 
the irresponsibility of actors in the region—
particularly in supplying weapons—has 
challenged the collective security system of 
the UN. 
The final challenge raised by Dr. Welsh relates 
to the issues surrounding the use of military 
force. There remain vital legal questions 
surrounding the use of force. For example, 
if force cannot be used legally without 
authorization from the Security Council, what 
do we do in situations where the Council is 
paralyzed? If regional organizations have 
an intervention mechanism, do they need 
Council authorization prior to action? There 
are also operational questions involved. How 
can protection actually be achieved through 
military means? What can air power achieve, 
and where does it remain insufficient? How 
can we ensure that we minimize harm 
through the use of military means? How do 
we ensure that we act proportionately and 
comply with international humanitarian law? 
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These questions are all part of the agenda 
of ‘responsible protection.’ And there are 
postwar challenges as well. How can better 
we estimate the impact of using potentially 
destructive means and better prepare for 
the task of rebuilding? It has become a 
moral imperative for decision makers to 
better anticipate the consequences of 
using military means and to plan for those 
as best as they can. 
Dr. Welsh also noted the complex issues 
surrounding contexts involving non-state 
actors, and the practice of providing military 
assistance to states that are facing non-
state actors who are perpetrators of atrocity 
crimes. While she agreed that such military 
assistance can save lives, it also raises a 
set of legal and political issues that require 
consideration. Where the Security Council or 
regional organizations have authorized the 
provision of military assistance, the legality 
is relatively straightforward. The same is true 
of third-party military action where a state 
explicitly requests assistance. But when do 
those providing assistance become parties 
to the conflict? How do those providing 
assistance ensure that those engaged in 
action against non-state actors are not 
themselves committing gross violations of 
human rights or international humanitarian 
law? 
The invitation of a government to provide 
assistance is not the beginning and the end 
of the story. Examples of military assistance 
to states facing threats from non-state actors 
also illustrate the potential convergence of 
the RtoP agenda and the counter-terrorism 
agenda. This convergence is controversial 
for many who want to ensure that RtoP 
maintain a strong human rights focus. 
2015 offers us an opportunity to reflect on 
these challenges and take stock of RtoP. 
How has implementation progressed? 
What are the best practices? Where are 
the gaps? And what should our priorities 
be nationally, regionally, and globally? How 
do we make regional organizations and the 
UN work more effectively together and build 
a real partnership for protection? We need 
to remain optimistic about what RtoP can 
contribute. RtoP remains a very critical 
and welcome clarification of standards 
and responsibilities for protection that 
values both vulnerable populations and 
state sovereignty. The Secretary-General 
has emphasized that RtoP is designed to 
be an ally of state sovereignty and enhance 
the capacity of states to protect their 
populations. 
But optimism needs to be coupled with a 
keen appreciation of where we still need 
to go. RtoP is only ten years old, and only 
in the first phase of its normative evolution. 
We need to talk honestly about what it has 
achieved and what it still might achieve. 
Think, for example, how long it has taken 
to entrench the human rights agenda 
and to ensure that human rights norms 
are deeply embedded in societies, in 
legislation, and in social programs. This was 
not a straightforward process. There were 
contestations, setbacks, and critiques. So it 
will be with RtoP. 
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The third panel discussed how the 
Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) has evolved 
in the geopolitical landscape. Particular 
focus was placed on both broadening and 
deepening international commitment to RtoP 
principles as well as the results of empirical 
research on the relevance of the norm. 
Prevention, protection, and prosecution 
inclusive of their respective linkages were 
discussed as well.
Questions considered by the panel: How 
has RtoP evolved since its adoption at the 
2005 World Summit? How have the 2011 
intervention in Libya and failure of the 
Security Council to address the situation in 
Syria impacted RtoP? Do member states still 
utilize RtoP language and mandates? How 
can RtoP overcome political gridlock at the 
Security Council? How do you foresee RtoP 
changing international atrocity prevention 
over the next ten years?
Panelists
• Chair: Michael Doyle, Columbia Global 
Policy Initiative 
• Dr. Jennifer Welsh, Special Adviser to 
the Secretary-General on RtoP
• Ambassador Antonio de Aguiar 
Patriota, Permanent Representative of 
Brazil to the United Nations
• Ambassador Karel J.G. van Oosterom, 
Permanent Representative of the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands to the 
United Nations and Co-Chair of the 
Group of Friends for RtoP
• Maggie Powers, Columbia Global 
Policy Initiative
• Philipp Rotmann, Global Public Policy 
Institute
A simplified and well-circulated story 
suggests that international action in Libya 
and inaction in Syria has signaled the end of 
RtoP. However, empirical research presented 
by a panelist and widely supported by the 
remainder concluded that RtoP in fact 
remains widely referenced and broadly 
integrated in UN justificatory discourse. 
Such research is useful in breaking down 
stereotypes about the scope and nature of 
opposition to RtoP. Empirical research helps 
to remove assumptions that skepticism is 
based on ill motives. 
In an analysis of UN Security Council 
resolutions and presidential statements from 
2005 through February 2014, the panelist 
found that there were only six references 
to RtoP before March 2011 (including the 
authorization of the use of force in Libya). 
After the Libya intervention, there were more 
than six times as many references, with 15 
Third Panel: The Future of the 
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resolutions and 11 presidential statements 
of the Security Council citing RtoP. 
The panelist also noted that 79 different 
member states have made a total of 248 
affirmations of RtoP in the Security Council 
since March 2011. Only five states – Syria, 
Sudan, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Russia 
– made negative references to RtoP 
in that time. The panelist asserted that 
these empirical results reveal the Security 
Council’s continued and increasing use 
of RtoP frameworks despite the perceived 
backlash of Libya.
Moreover, debates today no longer focus 
on what RtoP is—instead, discourse is 
focused on how to practically and effectively 
implement the norm. Yet, broad use of the 
language, while a strong and generally 
positive indicator that demonstrates the 
currency the norm possesses, may have a 
corresponding negative quality. The panel 
expressed universal concern over the 
misuse of RtoP language by some nations 
as a way to masquerade ulterior motivations 
for unsanctioned intervention. 
Panelists thus agreed that no matter how 
often RtoP language is used, it still must be 
applied prudently and ethically in line with 
the normative framework as expressed in 
the three pillars. 
Through this lens one can reassess the 
lessons of Libya and Syria. One panelist 
pointed out that the Libyan situation is not 
necessarily the consequence of RtoP, and 
the lesson drawn should not be that coercive 
action is always wrong. Similarly, the Syrian 
situation reminds us of the cost of inaction. 
The fact is that the international community 
is neither perfect nor omniscient, and 
several panelists mentioned that actors 
need a sense of humility, flexibility, and 
openness for constant learning. Recognizing 
the failures of Libya and Syria is not solace 
to the lives lost, but it can serve as strong 
motivation to improve. 
With general agreement reached on the 
aforementioned elements of the current 
landscape, the panel focused on the practical 
challenges of prevention, protection, and 
pos-hoc accountability mechanisms. With 




respect to prevention, panelists considered 
practical limitations and expectations of such 
mechanisms. Early warning is challenged by 
biases—or assumed biases—of information 
and general public skepticism towards 
perceived ‘Western based’ organizations. 
Reduction of biases and skepticism through 
improvements in the moral authority of 
such institutions is imperative, one panelist 
suggested. 
An online participant from São Paulo 
broached an important question in asking 
how to advance early warning without 
raising concern over external surveillance. 
On this issue, the panel asserted that 
global fora and mechanisms might not 
always be best suited for this work and 
often regional or bilateral influence is more 
effective. An option to ameliorate concerns 
with respect to global fora is to universalize 
periodic reviews. Focal point networks are 
useful because they are peer-to-peer, and 
civil society plays a strong role in reducing 
misreporting and misrepresentation of 
events. Finally, the power of social media 
was addressed and considered favorable for 
galvanizing international support to prevent 
atrocity crimes and drawing attention to 
urgent crises. 
With respect to protection, the panel 
unanimously supported the premise behind 
the Responsibility while Protecting (RwP), 
but some expressed concern that the 
agenda lacked concrete ideas. The panel 
emphasized, in line with Pillar Two of RtoP, 
that protection does not necessarily imply 
forcible military action. Effective protection 
can come in a variety of forms, including 
development assistance or economic 
support. At the same time, a panelist 
noted that all development is not structural 
prevention; otherwise there would never 
be atrocity crimes. A panelist provocatively 
suggested that every prevention attempt 
should be treated as an experiment in order 
to build in the highest level of flexibility for 
continuous learning and to not become 
locked into certain irreversible paths.
In concluding remarks on the conference’s 
two days of discussion, the panelists noted 
that the RtoP agenda is alive and well and 
needs to be realized. The panelists then laid 
out a series of questions that remained after 
the conference and recommendations for 
how to move forward. They asserted that the 
RtoP agenda needs to address two issues 
of vital concern. First, prevention remains 
an unrealized component of the RtoP 
framework. Second, accountability has been 
a weak element in the protection agenda 
embodied in Pillar Three. 
With regard to prevention, we have not yet fully 
incorporated the academic knowledge and 
understanding of the origins of conflict into 
our debate. We have not yet defined what 
analytic capabilities would supplement 
the goal of prevention, whether in the UN 
Secretariat, in regional organizations, or 
through networks of NGOs. We have not 
fully made the case for how to combine 
the tools that one could bring to bear with 
regard to prevention activities. We know 
there is a gap but we do not yet understand 
what the right institutional structures 
are to tackle prevention at the global or 
regional level. Is this a role for ECOSOC, or 
a revitalized Peacebuilding Commission or 
is this something that should be embodied 
in the Human Rights Council or in some 
new body that might be established? Until 
we deal with those hard problems we will 
not be confident that a new emphasis on 
prevention is anything other than the status 
quo. Real intellectual work needs to be done 
in these areas. 
No matter how good prevention and 
assistance are, we know that there will be 
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emergencies that will require some form 
of a Pillar Three engagement. There again 
we need a better sense of what the range 
of mechanisms are from diplomacy and 
sanctions through targeted forms of force 
and lastly the need to rebuild. We need 
accountability in practice so that mandates 
that are handed out are not run away 
with. We have come to the end of the era 
of blank checks from the Security Council. 
The question is what kinds of mandates 
are written and how they are interpreted by 
those who can implement them. That will be 
a major ongoing discussion. 
We also need to take stock of the ongoing and 
evolving history of RtoP. Much as Kofi Annan 
established lessons learned mechanisms 
to assess the new style of peacekeeping 
missions in the early 1990s, RtoP activities 
need a lessons learned capacity to try to 
learn from these critical events. A meeting 
with the UN Secretariat, key member 
states, and academics should convene 
for a no-holds barred debate over Libya to 
come to some common understanding of 
the history and what can be learned from 
it. It is time also to have a retrospective on 
the failure to act on Syria. 
This agenda requires political leadership, 
and the General Assembly has a vital role 
to play. One panelist called on the Special 
Adviser to reach out to academics around 
the world who are engaged in these topics 
and recruit them as an informal research 
community. Academics and NGOs should 
step up and provide the necessary in-
depth research to assess and recommend 
improvements in policy. All of these steps 
need to be taken for the Responsibility to 
Protect to move forward and for effective 
and responsible prevention and response 
to situations of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleanings.





• UN Group of Friends of RtoP should formally discuss RwP and the 
need for monitoring and accountability mechanisms for Pillar Three 
RtoP frameworks
• Through the General  Assembly and Security Council thematic debates 
on protection of civilians, hold a thorough and candid discussion 
on the opportunities and limitations of peacekeeping for protection 
of civilians and develop lessons learned for protection of civilians 
mandate creation
• General Assembly should discuss the link between structural 
prevention and long-term peacebuilding within the RtoP framework
• Improve governance mechanisms and participation in the UN Security 
Council
• Member states should debate clearer threshold criteria for 
interventions using lessons learned from successful and failed 
interventions 
• Recognize the positive prevention action under RtoP in the 2008 and 
2013 Kenyan engagement and consider this an example for other 
early warning and early prevention activities 
Recommendations for Progress
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Governments and Regional Organizations
• Consider the use of bilateral state relationships, foreign direct 
investment, and international financial institutions as other avenues 
for effective prevention and diplomacy
• Universalize periodic reviews before relevant global bodies and 
recognize the importance of regional and sub-regional institutions, 
particularly civil society, in early warning
• Take a strong role as champions of RtoP in their national policies and 
within international and regional organizations 
• Ensure that mass atrocity crimes and accountability for mass 
atrocities is fully incorporated into national law
Academics and Civil Society
• Provide in depth analysis of prevention analytics, the  full range of 
measures of RtoP implementation, and options for accountability 
mechanisms for use of force mandates
• Host lessons learned retrospectives on the crises in Libya and Syria 




The Future of the Responsibility to Protect:
Responsibility While Protecting and Implementation Mechanisms
April 9 -10 | Columbia University Faculty House 
Keynote Speakers
• Ambassador Antonio de Aguiar Patriota, Permanent Representative of Brazil to the 
UN
• Dr. Jennifer Welsh, Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Responsibility to 
Protect
Thursday, April 9 
Welcome Dinner 
• Michael Doyle, Welcome and introduction 
Keynote: Ambassador Patriota on the Responsibility while Protecting and how to 
implement the Responsibility to Protect
Friday, April 10
Welcome and Introductions
• Michael Doyle, Columbia Global Policy Initiative 
A Case for Responsibility while Protecting
Questions to consider: What is the Brazilian concept Responsibility while Protecting (RwP)? 
How does RwP change RtoP? What direct policy implications does RwP have and what 
should states do to further RwP’s normative development?
• Moderator: Ambassador Patriota
• Gustavo Carlos Macedo, University of São Paulo
• João Marcos Leme, Brazilian Embassy London
• Antonio Jorge Ramalho, University of Brasilia
• Kai Michael Kenkel, Instituto de Relações Internacionais at PUC-Rio
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Operationalizing Responsibility to Protect: examining the full range of implementation 
mechanisms 
Questions to consider: How should RtoP be implemented from prevention to reaction? 
What are best practices for civilian protection and peacekeeping? How was RtoP used as a 
mediation tool in Kenya? What is the role of sanctions as a tool for atrocity prevention? Can 
force protect and, if so, when can it legitimately be used? 
• Moderator: Simon Adams, Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
• Emily Paddon, Columbia University 
• Elisabeth Lindenmayer, Columbia University
• Robert Pape, University of Chicago 
• Helen Mulvein, Legal Counsellor for the UK Mission to the UN 
 
Keynote: Dr. Jennifer Welsh and the Future of Responsibility to Protect
The Future of Responsibility to Protect
Questions to consider: How has RtoP evolved since its adoption at the 2005 World Summit? 
How have the 2011 intervention in Libya and failure of the Security Council to address 
the situation in Syria impacted RtoP? Do member states still utilize RtoP language and 
mandates? How can RtoP overcome political gridlock at the Security Council? How do you 
foresee RtoP changing international atrocity prevention over the next ten years? 
• Moderator: Michael Doyle
• Respondent: Dr. Welsh
• Ambassador Patriota
• Ambassador Karel J.G. van Oosterom, Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of 
the Netherlands to the UN (Co-chair of Group of Friends for RtoP)
• Maggie Powers, Columbia Global Policy Initiative 
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• Paragraphs 138-140, World Summit Outcome Document, 2005 (text 
below)
• Security Council Resolution 1970 (2011)
• Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011)
• Brazilian Concept Note on the Responsibility while  Protecting, 2011 
(text below)
• “Effective and Responsible Protection from Atrocity Crimes: Toward 




PARAGRAPH 138-140, WORLD SUMMIT OUTCOME DOCUMENT
Heads of state and government agreed to the following text on the Responsibility to Protect 
in the Outcome Document of the High-level Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly in 
September 2005
138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the 
prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary 
means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international 
community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility 
and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability.
139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility 
to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with 
Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take 
collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance 
with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with 
relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and 
national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly 
to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind 
the principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as 
necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those 
which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out.
140. We fully support the mission of the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on the 
Prevention of Genocide.
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2011 BRAZILIAN CONCEPT NOTE ON RESPONSIBILITY WHILE PROTECTING 
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General Assembly  
Sixty-sixth session  
Agenda items 14 and 117  
 
Integrated and coordinated implementation of and 
follow-up to the outcomes of the major United Nations 
conferences and summits in the economic, social and 
related fields  
 
Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit  
 Security Council  
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  Letter dated 9 November 2011 from the Permanent Representative 
of Brazil to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General  
 
 
 At the open debate of the Security Council on the protection of civilians in 
armed conflict, held on 9 November 2011, I had the honour of delivering a 
statement on behalf of Ambassador Antonio de Aguiar Patriota, Minister of External 
Relations of Brazil, expressing Brazil’s view that the international community, as it 
exercises its responsibility to protect, must demonstrate a high level of 
responsibility while protecting. In this regard, I am enclosing a concept note 
developed by the Government of Brazil on this issue entitled “Responsibility while 
protecting: elements for the development and promotion of a concept” (see annex).  
 I should be grateful if you would circulate the text of the present letter and its 
annex as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 14 and 117, and 
of the Security Council.  
 
 
(Signed) Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti  
Ambassador  









  Annex to the letter dated 9 November 2011 from the Permanent 




  Responsibility while protecting: elements for the development and 
promotion of a concept  
 
 
 1. Since the adoption of the Charter of the United Nations, in 1945, the 
thinking on the relationship between the maintenance of international peace and 
security and the protection of civilians, as well as on corresponding action by the 
international community, has gone through many stages.  
 2.  In the 1980s, voices emerged in defence of the idea of humanitarian 
intervention, of a droit d’ingérence.  
 3.  On its sixtieth anniversary, the United Nations incorporated the concept 
of the responsibility to protect in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit 
Outcome (General Assembly resolution 60/1), in terms and using parameters that 
were the result of long and intense negotiations.  
 4.  The concept of the responsibility to protect is structured in three pillars. 
The first pillar identifies the State as the primary bearer of the responsibility to 
protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity. The second pillar stresses the role of the international community in 
providing cooperation and assistance to allow States to develop local capacities that 
will enable them to discharge that responsibility. The third pillar, which applies to 
exceptional circumstances and when measures provided for in the first and second 
pillars have manifestly failed, allows for the international community to resort to 
collective action, in accordance with the norms and procedures established in the 
Charter.  
 5.  In addition to recognizing that each individual State has the primary 
responsibility for protecting its own population, the 2005 World Summit Outcome 
placed limitations on the use of force by the international community in the exercise 
of its responsibility to protect: (a) material (genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
and crimes against humanity); (b) temporal (upon the manifest failure of the 
individual State to exercise its responsibility to protect and upon the exhaustion of 
all peaceful means); and (c) formal (through the Security Council, in accordance with 
Chapters VI and VII of the Charter and on the basis of a case-by-case evaluation).  
 6.  The three pillars must follow a strict line of political subordination and 
chronological sequencing. In this sequencing, it is essential to distinguish between 
collective responsibility, which can be fully exercised through non-coercive measures, 
and collective security. Going beyond the exercise of collective responsibility and 
resorting to mechanisms in the domain of collective security implies that a specific 
situation of violence or threat of violence against civilians should be characterized 
as a threat to international peace and security. Needless to say, it is necessary to 
clearly differentiate between military and non-military coercion, with a view to 
avoiding the precipitous use of force.  
 7.  Even when warranted on the grounds of justice, legality and legitimacy, 
military action results in high human and material costs. That is why it is imperative 
to always value, pursue and exhaust all diplomatic solutions to any given conflict. 








As a measure of last resort by the international community in the exercise of its 
responsibility to protect, the use of force must then be preceded by a comprehensive 
and judicious analysis of the possible consequences of military action on a case-by-
case basis.  
 8.  Violence against civilian populations must be repudiated wherever it takes 
place. The 1990s left us with a bitter reminder of the tragic human and political cost 
of the international community’s failure to act in a timely manner to prevent violence 
on the scale of that observed in Rwanda. There may be situations in which the 
international community might contemplate military action to prevent humanitarian 
catastrophes.  
 9.  Yet attention must also be paid to the fact that the world today suffers the 
painful consequences of interventions that have aggravated existing conflicts, allowed 
terrorism to penetrate into places where it previously did not exist, given rise to new 
cycles of violence and increased the vulnerability of civilian populations.  
 10.  There is a growing perception that the concept of the responsibility to 
protect might be misused for purposes other than protecting civilians, such as 
regime change. This perception may make it even more difficult to attain the 
protection objectives pursued by the international community.  
 11.  As it exercises its responsibility to protect, the international community 
must show a great deal of responsibility while protecting. Both concepts should 
evolve together, based on an agreed set of fundamental principles, parameters and 
procedures, such as the following:  
 (a)  Just as in the medical sciences, prevention is always the best policy; it is 
the emphasis on preventive diplomacy that reduces the risk of armed conflict and 
the human costs associated with it; 
 (b)  The international community must be rigorous in its efforts to exhaust all 
peaceful means available in the protection of civilians under threat of violence, in 
line with the principles and purposes of the Charter and as embodied in the 2005 
World Summit Outcome;  
 (c)  The use of force, including in the exercise of the responsibility to protect, 
must always be authorized by the Security Council, in accordance with Chapter VII 
of the Charter, or, in exceptional circumstances, by the General Assembly, in line 
with its resolution 377 (V);  
 (d)  The authorization for the use of force must be limited in its legal, 
operational and temporal elements and the scope of military action must abide by 
the letter and the spirit of the mandate conferred by the Security Council or the 
General Assembly, and be carried out in strict conformity with international law, in 
particular international humanitarian law and the international law of armed conflict;  
 (e)  The use of force must produce as little violence and instability as 
possible and under no circumstance can it generate more harm than it was 
authorized to prevent;  
 (f)  In the event that the use of force is contemplated, action must be 









 (g)  These guidelines must be observed throughout the entire length of the 
authorization, from the adoption of the resolution to the suspension of the 
authorization by a new resolution;  
 (h)  Enhanced Security Council procedures are needed to monitor and assess 
the manner in which resolutions are interpreted and implemented to ensure 
responsibility while protecting;  
 (i)  The Security Council must ensure the accountability of those to whom 
authority is granted to resort to force.  
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